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CRIMINAL LAW
By DENNY C. GALIS*

The first thing that strikes one who is beginning to write a survey is the
sheer number of criminal cases that have traveled through the appellate
system. The most immediate and difficult job in preparing such an article
is deciding which cases shall be included and which cases shall be excluded. It then becomes apparent that the next choice is either to discuss
a few cases thoroughly or discuss more cases briefly. Going on the premise
that the criminal law practitioner might use an article of this type as a
beginning point of more extensive research, the writer has tried to refer to
as many cases as reasonably possible in the space allowed. The decision
as to which cases to include, the rather loose division into categories, and
the format have been, more or less, arbitrary decisions by the writer and
he assumes full responsibility for those decisions.
I.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Yawn v. State'
The only evidence that the defendant possessed marijuana was the testimony of the state's witness. While the police officer took the defendant to
the police station for the purpose of administering a blood alcohol test, the
vehicle was searched by another police officer who later informed the testifying officer that he had discovered marijuana therein. The appellate court
held that that statement was hearsay since the witness was not present but
was in the station with the defendant while the car was allegedly being
searched. Accordingly, it was error to deny the motion to suppress.
Overstreet v. State' and Brown v. State3
In the Overstreet case, it was held that an affidavit totally devoid of any
information that drugs of any kind are located on the premises searched
is an invalid affidavit and cannot sustain the search. Therefore, in the
Brown case, the warrant was further insufficient to support a search of
Brown's person when Brown was not mentioned in the affidavit, was not
shown to be an occupant of Overstreet's apartment but a mere visitor, and
the warrant did not specifically authorize the search of any other person
on said premises who might reasonably be involved in the commission of
the aforesaid violation.
* Attorney At Law, Athens, Georgia. University of Georgia (LL.B., 1959). Member of the
American
1. 134
2. 133
3. 133

Bar Association and the State Bar of Georgia.
Ga. App. 77, 213 S.E.2d 178 (1975).
Ga. App. 497, 211 S.E.2d 436 (1974).
Ga. App. 500, 211 S.E.2d 438 (1974).
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Danford v. State4
The defendant filed a motion to suppress contending that the search
warrant was issued on stale and insufficient information. Going on the
theory that the staleness objection is without merit where the affidavit
states that the activity is occurring, the court held there cannot be "staleness" where it is stated that the activity will occur in the immediate future.
The defendant's motion was properly overruled.
State v. Perry'
The court in this case set out the rule that
[w]here the hearsay of an informer is relied upon the affidavit must meet
two tests: (1) [t]he reasons for the informer's reliability must be furnished and (2) it must either state how the informer obtained the information or the tip must describe the criminal activity in such detail that the
magistrate may know it is more than a casual rumor circulating in the
underworld or an accusation based merely on the individual's general
reputation.'
The trial court's sustaining of the defendant's motion to suppress was
upheld.
7
Hiatt v. State

At the beginning of the trial on a charge of possession of marijuana, the
defendant orally moved to suppress the evidence. The appellate court held
that an oral motion to suppress did not meet the requirements of Ga. Code
Ann. §27-313(b) (Rev. 1972) and for this reason a denial was authorized.
State v. Swift'
In March, 1973, a rock festival was held on Jekyll Island. A road block
was set up by city and county law enforcment personnel to check for
driver's licenses, car inspection stickers, registrations, fugitives, and runaways. At times, members of the Georgia State Patrol were present. The
defendant was stopped and an officer testified that he walked around the
car and saw green vegetation on the floor mat that looked like marijuana.
He then searched the car and found a bag of marijuana in the glove compartment. The court of appeals had held that the road block was illegal
and a subterfuge and suppressed the marijuana. The supreme court in this
case reversed, holding that police officers may set up highway roadblocks
for the purposes stated and, if they incidently observe another crime, par4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

133 Ga. App. 890, 212 S.E.2d 501 (1975).
134 Ga. App. 313, 214 S.E.2d 377 (1975).
Id. at 314, 214 S.E.2d at 378.
132 Ga. App. 289, 208 S.E.2d 163 (1974).
232 Ga. 535, 207 S.E.2d 459 (1974).-
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ticularly where the evidence is in plain view, they may search and arrest
without a warrant.
9
Zimmerman v. State

Atlanta police officers obtained a search warrant authorizing the search
of described premises for certain illegal firearms and explosives. One of the
police officers, while searching in a warehouse or storage area, discovered
three Olivetti typewriters covered with yellow plastic bags. The typewriters were seized and taken to the front of the storage room for an identification check. It turned out that these typewriters were stolen from the Atlanta Board of Education. The defendant was then arrested. There were
no illegal weapons or explosives found. The appellate court excluded these
typewriters on the basis that there was no probable cause for their seizure,
i.e., there was nothing to indicate to the officer that they were stolen.
Bellamy v. State'0
In this instance, an affidavit in support of a search warrant set out that
there was probable cause to believe that a defendant, Owen, had drugs in
his possession and control and described the premises as a street address
and curtilage. The officer searched a vehicle and a U-Haul truck in the
driveway of the described property. The complaint of the defendant,
Bellamy, was that the court erred in holding that there was probable cause
to search the U-Haul truck because it was not specifically named in the
affidavit and therefore, it could not be held to be within the curtilage. The
appellate court held that the search of the U-Haul truck was proper in that
it was in the curtilage, whether it was named or not.
State v. Toomey"
The defendant had apparently tied into a private phone line of a local
industry and was using the line to discuss drug parties and the usage of
drugs. An investigator called in by the industry listened to various phone
conversations and, as a result of what he heard, went before a justice of
the peace and acquired a search warrant. The search revealed drugs on the
defendant's premises. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the intercepted phone conversation. The appellate
court upheld the trial judge who had sustained the motion to suppress on
the grounds that the investigator did not follow the requirements of Ga.
Code Ann. §§26-3001, -3004 (Rev. 1972). These statutes make it unlawful
to intercept phone conversations without making written application
under oath to the district attorney or attorney general, showing probable
9. 131 Ga. App. 793, 207 S.E.2d 220 (1974).
10. 134 Ga. App. 340, 214 S.E.2d 383 (1975).
11. 134 Ga. App. 343, 214 S.E.2d 421 (1975).
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cause, and obtaining the necessary warrant from the judge of a superior
court.
2
Pritchett v. State1

Police officers of Spalding County and Griffin, Georgia, received information over a period of several months that defendant, Pritchett, was
selling marijuana. A raid was planned but before it was executed, information was received from a confidential informer that Pritchett and his girl
friend were at that moment selling drugs in a Griffin parking lot. Pritchett
was not found in the parking lot but was seen driving down the street in
an automobile. He was stopped and searched, and marijuana was found
on the person of his girl friend who was riding with him in the front seat.
A motion to suppress was filed and denied, and the defendants were convicted. The evidence revealed that Pritchett was not at the place the
informant said he would be but was simply stopped while riding down the
street in an automobile. One of the reasons given by the appellate court
for sustaining the trial court's ruling upholding the search was that while
Pritchett was not caught in the process of selling illegal drugs, a search of
his co-defendant, Black, revealed marijuana.
The appellate court, in holding that probable cause did exist, did not
explain what constituted probable cause but merely stated that when the
defendants were located they were performing an illegal act, to-wit: possession of marijuana. This is contrary to the general theory that the fruits of
a search do not validate an otherwise invalid search. Frankly, it is the
writer's position that the court has stretched beyond permissible limits in
sustaining this search. Certainly the fact that marijuana was ultimately
found should be of no help in sustaining that search.
Culpepper v. State3
In this case, some of the evidence given by the defendant in support of
his motion to suppress was later presented to the jury over the objections
of his counsel. The appellate court held that it was intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. The defendant's objections to the testimony of the officers at the
trial should have been sustained.
Also, the defendant was convicted by a jury which was never sworn to
try the particular case at bar as required by Ga. Code Ann. §59-709 (Rev.
1965). The appellate court held that this is a matter which cannot, in any
manner or under any circumstances, be waived. Therefore, this was also
reversible error.
12.
13.

134 Ga. App. 254, 214 S.E.2d 180 (1975).
132 Ga. App. 733, 209 S.E.2d 18 (1974).
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Nealey v. State4

In this instance, certain objects were picked up by police officers in a
cabin where the defendant was arrested. These items were picked up by
officers who returned to the cabin following the defendant's arrest and
incarceration. It was conceded that there was no search warrant obtained.
The state contended that because the appellant testified that he did not
own the cabin from which the evidence was procured, he had no standing
to suppress the evidence. However, he further testified that he had the
right to use the cabin, that it belonged to a relative, and that he was
authorized to use it at his discretion. This, the court held, gave him standing and the motion should have been sustained. However, in a strange
decision, the court further reviewed the evidence and held that the objects
admitted improperly were harmless error and that there was sufficient
evidence without those objects to sustain the conviction.
II.

SENTENCING

Hopper v. Thompson 5
In this case, the court reaffirmed the rule that even in the absence of
objection on behalf of the defendant, the admission of prior invalid convictions at the sentencing voids the sentence. The convictions held void in this
case were found to be so on the basis that there was no evidence to support
a finding that the defendant had waived the right to counsel on these
charges and that the waiver of such right cannot be presumed from a silent
record under Gideon v. Wainright.16
Wiley v. State 7
The appellant entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced under the first
offender statute" to serve three years on probation. Subsequently, after a
hearing, appellant's sentence was revoked and he was sentenced to serve
ten years in the penitentiary. It was from this judgment that he appealed.
It was held by the court of appeals that even though Ga. Code Ann. §272727 (Rev. 1974) allows the court to put the defendant on probation before
an adjudication of guilt, in the event that probation is revoked the judge
may not increase the sentence.
The supreme court then overruled that decision in State v. Wiley 9 by
holding that the result of the first offender treatment is to interrupt the
disposition of a defendant's case to see whether or not he can successfully
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

233
232
372
131
GA.
233

Ga. 326, 211 S.E.2d 286 (1974).
Ga. 417, 207 S.E.2d 57 (1974).
U.S. 355 (1963).
Ga. App. 511, 206 S.E.2d 140 (1974).
CODE ANN. §27-2727 to -2732 (Rev. 1972).
Ga. 316, 210 S.E.2d 790 (1974).
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complete probation. If he cannot, the disposition resumes and he can be
sentenced to any term allowed by law without regard to the length of the
prior probated sentence.
20
Collett v. State

The court of appeals in this instance apparently brought our trial courts,
perhaps screaming and kicking, into the Twentieth Century by holding
that a condition imposed on the suspension of a sentence which amounted
to banishment from certain counties in the state was void as against public
policy. The supreme court in State v. Collett2 ' immediately returned us to
the Nineteenth Century by saying that, while one cannot be banished from
the state, he can be banished from certain areas within the state.
22
Parrott v. State

Defendant was convicted of a theft and sentenced for a felony. The only
evidence of the value of the stolen property was contained in a transcript
of the pre-sentence hearing which, as filed in the court of appeals, quoted
the investigating police officer's testimony that the item was worth anywhere from ten cents to three dollars. It was contended that this was an
erroneous transcription and that the actual testimony was one hundred to
three hundred dollars. The state attempted unsuccessfully to locate the
tapes of the hearing which were used by the reporter, now deceased, to
make up the transcript. The appellate court held that under Ga. Code
Ann. §6-805(a) (Rev. 1975) and §27-2401 (Rev. 1972), it is the duty of the
state in all felony cases to have the transcript of evidence and proceedings
reported and prepared and, after a guilty verdict, to file the transcript. The
failure of the state to file a complete and accurate transcript, even where
caused, as here, by its inability to file it (and not by the appellant's fault)
effectively denies the appellant his right to appeal. Accordingly, the portion of the judgment sentencing the defendant to felony punishment was
reversed and the case was remanded to the trial court for the purpose of
conducting another pre-sentence hearing to determine the value of the
stolen property so that defendant could be resentenced according to the
value proved.
Hill v. Hopper

3

The appellate court held that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which requires that the length of possible sentence be explained
before a guilty plea is taken, is not a rule of constitutional magnitude.
20.
21.
22.
23.

131
232
133
233

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

App. 411, 206 S.E.2d 70 (1974).
668, 208 S.E.2d 472 (1974).
App. 931, 213 S.E.2d 77 (1975).
633, 212 S.E.2d 810 (1975).
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Consequently it is not error under Georgia procedure to fail to give that
information to the defendant in an otherwise voluntarily-given guilty plea.
Calhoun v. Couch24
Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of burglary. He was probated on
the condition precedent that he pay a fine of two hundred fifty dollars and
restitution to each of two victims. Appellant began serving his sentences
in the custody of the appellee, Warden Couch. Subsequently, restitution
was made but the fines were not paid. Petitioner sought release on habeas
corpus on the basis that Williams v. Illinois,5 Morris v. Schoonfield,6 and
Tate v. Short 7 require the conclusion that he had been denied equal protection of the law. The appellate court held that those cases did not apply
in this instance because they involved situations where an individual was
held in jail to pay a debt, and by paying the debt would have escaped a
prison sentence altogether. In this instance, the petitioner received a prison
sentence in any event. Payment of the fine was simply made a condition
of whether he would serve that sentence in confinement or out of confinement. Frankly, the writer does not see the distinction because the end
result is the same. If one can afford a fine and/or restitution, one is on the
street. If one cannot, one goes to prison.
Ballard v. State8
In this instance, the defendant entered a plea of guilty based on a plea
bargaining agreement between the district attorney's office and defendant's attorney. The court announced that it would sentence the defendant
to a more severe penalty. When defense counsel then attempted to withdraw the plea, the judge announced that he had signed the judgment
before sentence was pronounced specifically to prohibit the defendant from
withdrawing the plea. The appellate court held that the judgment must
not only be in writing and signed, but it must also be filed with the clerk
of the court. Consequently, the motion to withdraw was made within the
proper time and the defendant had the absolute right of withdrawal. The
decision further states that even after the pronouncement of a sentence,
the defendant has the legal right to move for a withdrawal of a guilty plea
and that upon such motion, the trial judge must exercise his legal discretion in deciding whether or not to grant the same. In this instance, the
trial judge not only had not pronounced sentence, but had also failed to
exercise any discretion.
24. 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E.2d 455 (1974).
25. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
26. 399 U.S. 508 (1970).
27. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
28. 131 Ga. App. 847, 207 S.E.2d 246 (1974). See also Burkett v. State, 133 Ga. App. 728,
212 S.E.2d 870 (1975).
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Elrod v. Caldwell2 9
Defendant, Elrod, filed a writ of habeas corpus in which he asserted that
he had pleaded guilty to an accusation for motor theft which did not charge
him with a second offense. However, he was sentenced as a multiple offender. Relying on previous decisions" which hold that one cannot be
indicted for only one offense carrying a maximum punishment and then
have maximum punishment increased under the recidivist statute at the
election of the district attorney, the court held that this applies to an
accusation as well. Even though an accusation can be amended, this one
was not.
3
Mullins v. State l

In this case, the trial court attempted to amend the original sentence
which, being for a term of years unauthorized by law, was void. The defendant, who had originally pleaded guilty, attempted by written motion to
withdraw such plea prior to the resentencing procedure. The trial judge
refused to allow him to do so saying that he was entering up the order nunc
pro tunc as of the date of the original sentence. This the trial court could
not do for two reasons. First, the sentence being void, there was nothing
to amend by, and second, the term having passed, the trial judge had no
authority to modify the sentence in any event. The defendant was entitled
to a new hearing on the sentence. Where the sentence is void, a valid
sentence may be imposed by the court, but until such valid sentence is
imposed, the defendant stands as though convicted but not sentenced.
Prevatte v. State and Jordan v. State"
In these cases, the district attorney, in the presence of the jury, made a
statement to the court in which he explained the appellate procedure
whereby the supreme court automatically considers any case involving a
death sentence. Although no objections to this statement were made in the
trial court, the appellants asserted on appeal that the above statement was
prejudicial in that it would influence the jury to act without exercising
reasonable caution and deliberation and to shift the responsibility for an
erroneous sentence.
The supreme court ruled on this even though no objection was raised in
the trial court. It was held that such statements constitute prejudicial error
in cases in which the accused is exposed to a death penalty. Where one of
the jury's functions is to impose punishment for a crime, a reference by
the prosecutor to the defendants' right to appeal is more likely to be con29. 232 Ga. 876, 209 S.E.2d 207 (1974).
30. Studdard v. State, 225 Ga. 410(1), 169 S.E.2d 327 (1969); Black v. Caldwell, 231 Ga.
589, 203 S.E.2d 208 (1974).
31. 133 Ga. App. 554, 211 S.E.2d 631 (1974).
32. 233 Ga. 929, 214 S.E.2d 365 (1975).
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sidered reversible error if a death penalty is subsequently imposed. This
is because, in weighing the imponderables, it cannot be concluded that the
jury was not influenced by such statements to impose a more severe punishment than their unbiased judgment would have given.
The two sentences of death for murder and the two sentences of death
for armed robbery were set aside and a new trial was ordered on the issue
of punishment for these offenses.
Nix v. State33
The court held that the questions raised by the appellant's habeas corpus petition in which he alleged that his felony conviction was void were
not moot even though he had completed the service of his sentence, since
he was suffering collateral consequences from the sentence.
Duncan v. Ricketts4
The appellant had his parole revoked without a hearing due to his failure
to appear in the City Court of Atlanta for alleged traffic violations. The
state, at the habeas corpus hearing, contended that the forfeiture of a cash
bond was the same as a finding of guilt under Ga. Code Ann. §24-310(a)
(Rev. 1971). However, the appellate court held that under Ga. Code Ann.
§24-312a(b) (Rev. 1971), any traffic violation under the jurisdiction of the
Traffic violation Bureau is characterized as a "traffic violation" and shall
not be considered as a misdemeanor. Consequently, the admission of guilt
to a traffic offense under the jurisdiction of a traffic violation bureau, such
as was involved here, is not one of the specified exceptions to the statutory
requirement that there be a hearing before a parole is revoked. Therefore,
a failure to hold such a hearing was a denial of due process.
Bailey v. Baker5
Petitioner, Bailey, entered a guilty plea to the charge of aggravated
assault with the intent to murder and was sentenced to ten years on probation and to make restitution of three thousand dollars. Approximately
three years later, her probation was revoked and she was imprisoned to
serve the remainder of her sentence. She filed habeas corpus on the theory
that the trial court did not advise her of her rights as required by Boykin
v. Alabama3 1 whereby the defendant must be instructed on the record
concerning what the plea connoted and its consequences. In the habeas
corpus hearing, the attorney who had previously represented the defendant, attempted to testify that he gave her the necessary instructions
33. 233 Ga. 73, 209 S.E.2d 597 (1974). See also Parris v. State, 232 Ga. 687, 208 S.E.2d
493 (1974).
34. 232 Ga. 89, 205 S.E.2d 274 (1974).
35. 232 Ga. 84, 205 S.E.2d 278 (1974).

36. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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regarding the consequences of a guilty plea. The petitioner attempted to
invoke the attorney-client privilege saying that the trial court was the only
legal source of instruction with regard to the consequences of a guilty plea.
The appellate court, saying that this was a case of first impression in
Georgia, held that the trial court was not necessarily the only source of said
information and the petitioner could not on the one hand contend that she
was ignorant of certain facts and on the other hand prevent the attorney
from testifying as to his instruction concerning those facts.
7
Gregg v. State

Gregg was tried on four counts, two of which consisted of murder. The
other two consisted of armed robbery. He was convicted on all four counts
and the death penalty was given on each. However, in the jury's verdict it
was stated that the aggravating circumstances in recommending death for
the two counts of robbery were the murders, and the murders were then
found to be the aggravating circumstances in the armed robberies. The
supreme court set aside the two sentences of death for the offenses of armed
robbery beause the two different crimes cannot each be used as aggravating circumstances in the other. That is, if the armed robbery is used as an
aggravating circumstance for the murder, then the murder cannot be used
as an aggravating circumstance for the robbery.
Scott v. Staten3
This appeal questioned whether the evidence in the case was sufficient
to authorize a revocation of the probationary sentence under Ga. Code
Ann. §27-2713 (Rev. 1972). The court reviewed the case law dealing with
a probationer's rights when faced with a revocation and concluded that the
trial court does not even have to support the revocation finding by a preponderance of evidence. The judge is the trier of fact, and while he cannot
act from whim or caprice, he has a very wide discretion.
III.

WITNESSES

39
Nix v. State

Under the statute requiring corroboration of an accomplice's testimony
in any case of a felony, Ga. Code Ann. §38-121 (Rev. 1974), the corroborating circumstances must connect the defendant with the crime independently of the accomplice's testimony. It is not sufficient that the accomplice be corroborated with respect to time, place, and circumstances if there
is nothing to connect the defendant therewith.
37.
38.
39.

233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974).
233 Ga. 815, 213 S.E.2d 676 (1975).
133 Ga. App. 417, 211 S.E.2d 26 (1974).

ERRATA
Scott v. State cited at 27 Mercer L. Rev. at 66 and corresponding
footnote 38 (233 Ga. 815, 213 S.E.2d 676 (1975)) SHOULD BE Christy v.
State, 134 Ga. App. 504, 215 S.E.2d 267 (1975).
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Moody v. State40

In this instance, a witness was held in contempt for failure to appear as
directed by subpoena and for appearing in a courtroom while under the
influence of alcohol. Her appearance, however, in the courtroom in that
condition was not voluntary, but resulted from her having been arrested
and conveyed there by the sheriff's office. This was the determining factor
in holding that she could not be held in contempt merely for appearing
there in a drunken condition. It was further held that she was entitiled to
notice and a hearing before being held in contempt on the ground of failure
to respond to a subpoena.
Murphy v. State"
Defendant was indicted for an aggravated assault. His sole defense was
to be insanity at the time of the act caused by epilepsy. His main witness
was a doctor who had supposedly treated him for epilepsy and who had
been subpoenaed but failed to respond to the subpoena. A motion was
made to the court to force the witness' attendance at the trial. At a hearing,
the defendant met all the requirements of Ga. Code Ann. §81-1410 (Rev.
1956) in making a formal showing for a continuance, except that he could
not show that he could produce the witness at the next term of court and
could not state what the doctor's testimony would show. The defendant
was unable to show these matters because the doctor refused to communicate with the defendant's attorney or to obey the subpoena. Apparently,
the doctor-witness was totally uncooperative and uncommunicative. It was
held that under the circumstances of this case, it was reversible error for
the trial court to overrule the defendant's motion and the trial court should
have exercised its authority to bring the witness to court.
IV.

EVIDENCE

Quinn v. State42
Defendant was charged with an assault by shooting the prosecuting
witness with a pistol. Defendant's attorney asked the witness whether or
not he had a civil action pending against the defendant arising out of the
same incident. It was held to be error for the trial judge to refuse to let
the witness answer the question. The appellate court held that it was
admissible to show interest or possible bias on the part of the witness. The
instant decision was distinguished from Faulk v. State43 where it was held
that the same type testimony was rightfully excluded to show motive because the filing of the civil suit happened after the criminal warrant was
40.
41.
42.
43.

131 Ga. App. 355, 206 S.E.2d 79 (1974).
132 Ga. App. 654, 209 S.E.2d 101 (1974).
132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974).
47 Ga. App. 804, 171 S.E. 570 (1933).
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issued. Apparently, the testimony that a civil suit is pending on behalf of
the prosecuting witness is admissible to show interest, but not admissible
to show motive.
Cagle v. State44
Defendant was charged with burglary and with theft of a motor vehicle.
With counsel present, and shortly after his arrest, the defendant agreed to
take a lie detector test. Later that same day, with counsel present, defendant made a statement denying participation in the burglary and in the
theft of the vehicle. On the trial of the case, the state, over defendant's
objection, admitted the results of the polygraph examination. The appellate court held that this was reversible error. Under Georgia law, the results
of a lie detector, favorable or unfavorable to the accused, are not admissible as evidence, even when, as in this case, the evidence was admitted for
impeachment purposes.
Bryant v. State and Smalwood v. State45
In this instance, defendant Bryant was offered immunity if she would
state what she knew about the alleged robbery. She admitted certain incriminating facts and then stated that she would not testify because she
feared reprisal by co-defendant Smallwood. Defendant Bryant's admissions were offered by law enforcement officers in testimony at the trial.
Objection was made on the ground that the information was elicited by the
hope of reward, but the trial court admitted it against both defendants.
The appellate court held that it could not be admitted against Bryant over
her objection because it is always reversible error to allow a confession or
incriminatory statement in evidence against the maker thereof when it is
not freely and voluntarily made, or when made with the hope of reward,
i.e., immunity.
Hess v. State"
This is the famous "Five Dollar Rocking Chair" case. Ms. Hess' conviction was overturned on the basis that the prosecutrix, the owner of the
house from which the chair was taken, was allowed to testify at the trial
that she went to the house several days after the defendant was arrested
and compiled a long list of other items that were taken from the house.
The only item which could be connected with the defendant was the chair.
None of the other items had been moved from the house by the defendant
and none were found in the car on the occasion in question or in possession
of the defendant. Testimony concerning any of the listed items was harmful error.
44.
45.
46.

132 Ga. App. 227, 207 S.E.2d 703 (1974).
132 Ga. App. 186, 207 S.E.2d 671 (1974).
132 Ga. App. 26, 207 S.E.2d 580 (1974).
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Eades v. State"
The defendant complained of error in that the crime with which he was
charged was committed prior to the enactment of Ga. Code Ann. §38-415
(Rev. 1974) which eliminated the opportunity for an accused to make an
unsworn statement. Therefore, he contended that he should have been
allowed to make such a statement, even though the trial was after the
effective date of such act. The appellate court held that this was not an
ex post facto law because the method whereby the defendant gets his story
to the jury is procedural only. The trial must be governed by the procedural
rules in existence at the time of trial, rather than at the time of offense.

Hancock v. State"
The appellate court held in this case that if the defendant takes the
stand and testifies to a state of facts contrary to his prior statements, those
prior statements may be given in evidence solely for the purposes of impeachment, with the proper caution by the trial court, even though those
statements were previously made by the defendant without the proper
Miranda warnings.
49
Robinson v. State

This case discussed the difference between an incriminatory statement
and a confession, and cited the rule that where a defendant has made an
incriminating statement and not a confession, it is prejudicial error to
charge the law of confession. It then proceeded to attempt to explain the
difference between the two and came up with the conclusion that a confession, as distinct from an incriminating admission, is a statement inconsistent with the possibility of the accused's innocence for the crime charged.
A statement which includes facts or circumstances which show excuse or
justification is not a confession even if it admits the main fact.
5
Russell v. State 1

The court relied, in a marijuana conviction, on the law that evolved from
illegal whiskey cases which states that
even the presumption of law that whiskey found in the house belongs to
the head of the house is not sufficient to support a verdict of guilty, where
the defendant's occupancy of the premises is maintained by him and his
family jointly with others."1
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

232 Ga. 735, 208 S.E.2d 791 (1974).
131 Ga. App. 485, 206 S.E.2d 104 (1974).
232 Ga. 123, 205 S.E.2d 210 (1974).
132 Ga. App. 35, 207 S.E.2d 619 (1974).
Id. at 36, 207 S.E.2d at 620.
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This gave rise to the "equal opportunity" situation as explained in Brown
v. State.5 2 This same basic theory was applied in Ridley v. State 3 in an
entirely different situation. In this instance, the defendant was a prisoner
in the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center and was charged with
possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner. It was found secreted in his
cell but the evidence revealed that the prisoners had the option to leave
their cells unlocked when they were out, and it was not unusual for one
inmate to go into another inmate's cell. The defendant also testified, without dispute, that other prisoners always had access to his cell. The court
held that these circumstances did not rule out all other reasonable hypotheses except the hypothesis of guilt of the accused.
54
Pepper v. State

The first error committed by the trial court was in failing to charge the
law of alibi where the appellant's sole defense was alibi. The appellate
court held that the trial court should have so charged, even without request. The trial court committed further error in charging the jury that a
single witness is sufficient to establish a fact except in a felony case where
the only witness is an accomplice. The judge charged the jury that whether
the state's witness was an accomplice was a question for the jury to determine and the test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice is
whether or not the witness could be indicted for the offense. If so, he is
deemed to be an accomplice. However, it was held error that the trial court
did not go further in giving the jury a standard by which they could determine whether said witness could be indicted for the offense and could thus
be considered an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration.
Wattley v. State5
During the pre-sentence hearing after conviction, a character witness
was offered by the defendant to prove his good character. On crossexamination, the state was allowed to ask the witness whether or not he
had heard that the defendant had been charged with various crimes. The
trial court ruled that this was permissible in that a person's reputation is
what his friends and neighbors say about him, irrespective of the truth of
those sayings, as opposed to his character which is what he really is. The
appellate court proceeded to express its strong disapproval of this type of
evidence, even going so far as to quote the ethical rules as approved by the
supreme court for the State Bar of Georgia, to-wit: "A lawyer shall not...
state or allude to any matter. . . that will not be supported by admissible
evidence." 5 The court then said that this ethical consideration has not
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

94 Ga. App.542, 95 S.E.2d 302 (1956).
232 Ga.646, 208 S.E.2d 466 (1974).
133 Ga. App. 1, 209 S.E.2d 699 (1974).
131 Ga. App. 320, 205 S.E.2d 517 (1974).
Id. at 321, 205 S.E.2d at 518
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been given legislative sanction or been written into a decision, and therefore, it cannot have the effect of overturning the defendant's conviction.
Banks v. State7
In this case, the defendant was convicted of a violation of the Public
Nuisance Act of Clayton County, Georgia, in that she had unlawfully
dumped a bag of garbage on Postum Road. The sole evidence against her
was the fact that the bag of garbage included a letter bearing her name.
She testified that she had never disposed of her own garbage, that it was
handled by her son, and that she had never dumped garbage on Postum
Road and did not know of anyone who may have dumped any garbage
along Postum Road. The court held that this circumstantial evidence did
not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the
accused and that the defendant should have been exonerated.
Jones v. States'
The appellant in this case was convicted on two counts of rape, one count
of aggravated sodomy, and three counts of armed robbery. His basic complaint was that the trial judge excluded the testimony of a psychiatrist who
was to testify concerning the credibility of eye witnesses. The court gave a
long description of the standards under which expert testimony is admissible. It excluded the expert testimony of the psychiatrist concerning the
witness' credibility on the basis that credibility was for the jury to decide
and there was insufficient observation of the assailed witness by the expert.
The court concluded that generally, the best method of attacking the credibility of an eye witness identification is by cross-examination. The memory
of a witness may not be disparaged by other witnesses in order to impeach
that testimony. It must be done by cross-examination of the witness whose
recollection is under attack.
5
Williamson v. State

This can be called the "Case of the Phantom Pistol." Defendant,
Williamson, was convicted of possession of stolen property based on evidence that he was a passenger in another individual's automobile and that
a stolen .38 caliber pistol was found under the seat where Williamson was
sitting. Both Williamson and the driver denied any knowledge of the ownership of the pistol or of how it got there. Apparently, it simply appeared
when the law enforcement officers stopped the car. In any event, the appellate court reversed the decision based on the facts that the pistol being
stolen and the accused sitting in the automobile seat under which it was
57.
58.
59.

131 Ga. App. 215, 205 S.E.2d 520 (1974).
232 Ga. 762, 208 S.E.2d 850 (1974).
134 Ga. App. 329, 214 S.E.2d 415 (1975).
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found were not sufficient to show that he had possession and, therefore,
would not authorize a conviction.
0
Royal v. State"

The defendant was convicted of theft of lost or mislaid property. Under
Ga. Code Ann. §26-501 (Rev. 1972) every essential element of the crime
charged must be established. In this case, it was proven by the evidence
that the copper tubing in question was clearly stolen from the owner and
that the owner had not lost or misplaced it. Consequently, the defendant
was entitled to an acquittal.
Phillips v. State"'
This is an interesting case in that the opinion states that it consititues
the first appellate court ruling wherein reliance is solely upon the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. §27-1802 (Rev. 1972), which allows a directed
verdict of not guilty by the trial court. This case ended up in the court of
appeals because the trial ended in a mistrial and defendant had filed a
motion for a judgment of not guilty notwithstanding the mistrial. The trial
court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. After reviewing the
evidence, the court of appeals ruled that the trial court should have sustained the motion for acquittal.
Phillips v. State2
The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana but the only
marijuana connected to the defendant was an egg carton containing small
growing plants. These plants were taken to the sherriff's office where they
were permitted to die and were discarded. The plants were not analyzed
by the State Crime Laboratory. The sheriff was allowed to testify that he
had observed growing marijuana plants and thought those plants seized
were marijuana, but he could not be sure. The appellate court held that
this testimony did not eliminate every other reasonable hypothesis save
that of the guilt of the defendant and he should not have been convicted.
V.

JURY CHARGE

Tift v. Statem
This is a marijuana case in which the appellate court held that it is error
'to fail to charge that possession of marijuana must be "knowledgeable"
possession to be unlawful. There must be criminal intent, and this should
have been charged without a request.
60.
61.
62.
63.

134
133
133
133

Ga. App. 203, 213
Ga. App. 461, 211
Ga. App. 392, 210
Ga. App. 455, 211

S.E.2d 561
S.E.2d 411
S.E.2d 858
S.E.2d 409

(1975).
(1974).
(1974).
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McNeill v. State"'
One of the defendant's contentions was that the trial court erred in
charging the jury on entrapment by failing to further instruct the jury that
the burden of disproving entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt was upon
the state. The appellate court agreed with this contention and reversed the
conviction.
Owens v. State"
The supreme court held in this case that the standards of jury selection
applicable in death cases, as set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois," must be
inquired into by the trial court on voir dire, and the failure to record the
Witherspoon voir dire, in a case in which the sentence of death is imposed,
is reversible error.
Maddox v. Staten
Defendant Maddox appealed on the ground, among others, that Ga.
Code Ann. §59-112(b) (Rev. 1965), which permits women to be excluded
from jury service merely by notifying the jury commissioner in writing to
that effect, was unconstitutional and denied him a proper jury panel from
which to select the trial jury. The supreme court discussed this at some
length and found that the statute standing alone does not necessarily result
in a jury box that is almost totally male and therefore, is constitutional.
Edwards v. State"
In this murder conviction, the jury requested further instructions on
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. The
judge refused to give further instructions upon determining that the jury
already had a verdict, but had not yet given it in open court. It was held
that when a jury requests the court to recharge them on any point, it is
the court's duty to do so.
Gould v. State9
Although there were several cases during the surveyed period in which
the defendant raised the objection that the jury box was not properly
compiled, the appellate courts did not hold much sympathy for that contention where it was either totally or partially without substantial evidence
to reflect the composition of the jury box vis-a-vis the composition of the
64.
65.

134 Ga. App. 45, 213 S.E.2d 119 (1975).
233 Ga. 869, 214 S.E.2d 173 (1975).

66. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
67. 233 Ga. 874, 213 S.E.2d 654 (1975).
68. 233 Ga. 625, 212 S.E.2d 802 (1975).
69. 131 Ga. App. 811, 207 S.E.2d 519 (1974).
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available jurors. In the instant case, the defendant's contention was upheld
on the basis of substantial statistical material submitted by the defendant.
The decision itself contains some of the statistics and charts presented in
the court. It seems to the writer that Gould would be a substantial guideline to any practitioner attempting to challenge the composition of the jury
box.
0
Linder v. State"

A charge that the defendant
has the right to either testify or to remain silent, as the burden is not on
him to establish his innocence, but upon the state to prove guilt, and if
he makes no statement or does not testify, this does not infer guilt, and
such failure should not be considered for or against him ....
11
was found to violate Ga. Code Ann. §38-415 (Rev. 1974) which expressly
forbids any comment on defendant's taking the stand or his failure to take
the stand. Here, the charge constituted reversible error.

VI.

RIGHT

To

COUNSEL

7
Smith v. State 1

Where the state's witness testified on cross-examination that he could
not recall whether the defendant requested that a lawyer be present at the
interrogation and that he was not denying that the defendant requested a
lawyer, it was held reversible error to allow the statements resulting from
the interrogation in evidence over objection, because the state could not
demonstrate clearly that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel as required
73
by Miranda v. Arizona.
7
Moore v. Hopper"

This was a petition for habeas corpus based on the ineffective assistance
of counsel in filing an appeal. The defendant stated that his attorney did
not advise him of his right to appeal, that he did not know that he had
the right to appeal, and therefore, he did not request his attorney to file
an appeal. His attorney testified that he had no communication from
appellant in regard to filing an appeal. The court cited Holloway v.
5
Hopper"
in which the supreme court expressly disapproved earlier hold70.
71.
72.

132 Ga. App. 624, 208 S.E.2d 630 (1974).
Id. at 625, 208 S.E.2d at 632.
132 Ga. App. 491, 208 S.E.2d 351 (1974).

73. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74.
75.

233 Ga. 894, 213 S.E.2d 866 (1975).
233 Ga. 615, 212 S.E.2d 795 (1975).
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ings to the effect that the responsibility in determining whether to appeal
rests on counsel, and stated that those holdings should not be followed.
However, in the instant case, the supreme court held that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain appellant's contentions that he was not fully informed
of his appellate rights and that his direct appeal was foregone by his courtappointed attorney without his consent. Consequently, he was entitled to
file an appeal with the appointment of counsel.76
Mercer v. Hopper"
Per curiam, the court held that a defendant is not entitled to counsel at
his probation revocation hearing. In a special concurring decision, Justice
Hall found that the individual waived his right to counsel in this particular
instance, but dissented from the basic theory that a defendant was not
entitled to counsel at a probation hearing. The special concurring opinion
stated that this was in direct conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court case
of Gagnon v. Scarpelli.81
Grant v. State79
Clifford Grant, Jr. and Willie J. Grant were jointly indicted for the
offense of burglary. Upon the call of the case, their court-appointed counsel
announced that he was ready to proceed with Clifford, who was a jail
prisoner with whom he had conferred, but that he had not conferred with
nor seen Willie until the morning of the trial. He requested a severance as
to Willie and also requested permission to withdraw as Willie's counsel.
The court allowed counsel fifteen minutes to confer with Willie and stated
that if it were to grant a motion at all, it would be a continuance or
postponement, not a severance. The cases proceeded to trial and both
defendants were convicted. Under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. §272101 (Rev. 1972) as to misdemeanors and felonies less than capital, the
court has discretion as to severance. However, the appellate court held that
under these circumstances, the court should have granted the motion for
severance or continued the case. It was shown nowhere in the record that
Willie had ever received notice or knowledge that counsel had been appointed for him. Thus, no blame could be properly lodged against him for
failure to contact counsel.
Willingham v. State
The defendant in this instance involved various lawyers from time to
time in his case and ended up, against his wishes, with a public defender.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See
233
411
131
134

also Cunningham v. State, 232 Ga. 416, 207 S.E.2d 48 (1974).
Ga. 620, 212 S.E.2d 799 (1975).
U.S. 778 (1973).
Ga. App. 759, 206 S.E.2d 707 (1974).
Ga. App. 144, 213 S.E.2d 516 (1975).
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As part of his appeal, the defendant came up with the novel and imaginative proposition that if he was unable to employ his own cousel, then he
was immune from prosecution. The appellate court very quickly ruled
against him on this point.
VII.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL

Sander v. State8 '
In this instance, the defendantdemanded a speedy trial simply by writing a letter through his attorney to the court making that request. The
letter was not made a part of any of the court records. However, the
appellate court held that while the burden is on the defendant to make a
timely demand for trial, under Ga. Code Ann. §27-1901 (Rev. 1972) his
failure in doing so does not, of itself, work a waiver of the sixth amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. That amendment, being an independent guarantee of this right, and defendant's assertion or failure to assert his statutory
right was simply one of the factors to be considered in determining whether
the sixth amendment right had been impinged."2
VIIE.

EXTRADITION

Burton v. Stynchcombe s3
The governor of Michigan sought the extradition of Burton for trial in
that state for the offenses of fraudulent detention or use by a subcontractor
of building contract funds, and fraud by false pretenses. Burton filed a writ
of habeas corpus in the Fulton County Superior Court and contended that
the extradition proceeding was an endeavor to use the criminal process for
collection of civil debts. The appellate court held that the courts of the
asylum state cannot, upon a writ of habeas corpus, inquire into the guilt
or innocence of the accused, or any of his alleged defenses.
Gilistrap v. Wilder 4
Defendant, Gillstrap, now released from a Georgia prison but subject to
a Georgia governor's warrant for his extradition to Virginia, sought habeas
corpus to avoid extradition on the grounds that Virginia delayed an unreasonable length of time after indicting him before bringing a detainer
against him while he was in Georgia custody. He claimed that such delay
denied him his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The substance of the
decision held that the issue was improperly raised in an extradition pro81. 132 Ga. App. 580, 208 S.E.2d 597 (1974).
82. See Hall v. State, 131 Ga. App. 786, 206 S.E.2d 644 (1974) for the four relevant factors
in determing whether the constitutional requirements for a speedy trial have been carried out.
83. 232 Ga. 510, 207 S.E.2d 493 (1973).
84. 233 Ga. 968, 213 S.E.2d 895 (1975).
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ceeding and that the defendant should raise that question in the Virginia
courts after being sent there to answer the Virginia charges.
IX.

INDICTMENT

Stinnett v. Statea
An indictment in the superior court which has jurisdiction over both
felonies and misdemeanors, charging possession of marijuana, does not
have to state the amount of marijuana. Whether the defendant is guilty
of a felony or misdemeanor depends upon the proof at the trial of the
amount of marijuana possessed and the prior record of the defendant.
DeFoor v.State"
The defendant, a county commissioner, was indicted for theft by taking.
Several counts charged that the
defendant, as county commissioner, did "then and there having lawful
possession of the money of the county of Gordon . . ."appropriate said
property to their [defendant's and co-defendant's] own use in that the
said county commissioner "did make, draw, and sign a check" in a specified amount upon funds of the County of Gordon. ...
The court of appeals held that the indictment should be quashed because
the title to the funds was in the bank. The county commissioner was
therefore a creditor of the bank as to said funds, and the bank was a debtor
as to the funds. The demurrers to those counts of the indictment should
have been sustained.
The supreme court overruled this decision on the grounds that at the
time the thefts charged were completed, the money had been drawn from
the bank and the bank no longer had title.88
Nelms v. State89
In this case, after ample explanation by the defendant's attorney to the
defendant, the defendant's attorney signed on the back of an accusation
the following: "The defendant waives formal arraignment, copy of bill of
indictment, list of witnesses sworn before the Grand Jury, and agrees to
strike from a panel of jurors and pleads not guilty."90 Upon a jury trial, he
was convicted and sentenced, and thereafter attacked the sentence by
habeas corpus. The court of appeals held that this did not amount to a
85. 132 Ga. App. 261, 208 S.E.2d 16 (1974).
86. 131 Ga. App. 767, 206 S.E.2d 713 (1974).
87. Id. at 767, 206 S.E.2d at 713 (emphasis by the court).
88. DeFoor v. State, 233 Ga. 190, 210 S.E.2d 707 (1974).
89. 132 Ga. App. 689, 209 S.E.2d 110 (1974).
90. Id. at 691, 209 S.E.2d at 111.
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waiver of actual indictment by a grand jury and the judgment was reversed.
X.

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Echols v. State"'
The state, relying on Hill v. Willis," contended that since the defendant
did not assign error upon the denial of his motion for a new trial, no
question was presented for decision in this court. The appellate court noted
previous decisions which have held that since the rules of the court were
amended March 2, 1972, and specifically by rule 14(e) which provides that
"'[tihe enumeration of errors shall be deemed to include and present for
review all judgments necessary for a determination of errors specified,' the
'' 3
rule of Hill v. Willis is superceded.
Cross v. State4
The appellant in this case filed a motion to suppress certain tape recordings of his telephone conversation with police officers and the testimony
related thereto. He had filed a previous motion to suppress the identical
evidence and this ruling was sustained by the court of appeals. The case
was returned to the trial court for final disposition. In the instant case by
the same defendant, the supreme court held that
[a]n appellant may not avoid a judgement of the court of Appeals
which affirms the denial of his [prior] motion . ..by filing another
motion to suppress the same evidence when the case is returned to the
trial court, attacking the constitutionality of a portion of the law under
which the Court of Appeals' decision is rendered where there has been no
subsequent change in the law. 5
91. 134 Ga. App. 216, 213 S.E.2d 907 (1975).
92. 224 Ga. 263, 161 S.E.2d 281 (1968).
93. 134 Ga. at 216-17, 213 S.E.2d at 908 (citations omitted).
94. 233 Ga. 960, 214 S.E.2d 374 (1975).
95. Id. at 961, 214 S.E.2d at 376.

